is complicated by a lack of common agreement on the nature of the threat, something that can be addressed through operational design. 5 Second, the TSCTP provides a framework for viewing the difficulty of coordinating a synchronized regional security strategy at the national level in an interagency environment. As late as July 2008, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted the TSCTP lacked -a comprehensive, integrated strategy.‖ 6 The evolution of the TSCTP strategy reveals that the whole-of-government approach grew from the bottom up from the region rather than the top down. Finally, a review of the TSCTP highlights the difficulties of implementing a whole-of-government strategy in an interagency environment at the country level.
When conducting Phase Zero military operations and shaping activities, frictions can arise at the embassy level. 7 These frictions --which can relate to capacity deficits, cultural misunderstanding between U.S. organizations, and questions of legal authorities of ambassadors (Chiefs of Mission or COMs) and the Geographic Combatant Commander (GCCs) --should be anticipated in interagency operations.
Understanding the nature of these frictions that occur at the embassy level when implementing a whole-of-government approach may ultimately distinguish a successful Irregular Warfare campaign from a failed one.
Framing the Problem: What is the threat?
The Sahel is a sparsely populated area with porous borders, little central government control of rural areas, and vast distances between population centers in the south and deserts in the north where the terrorists operate. 8 The principal terrorist group of strategic interest in the region is The Organization of al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM's predecessor, The Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), was designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization on March 27, 2002 . 9 The GSPC officially merged with al-Qa'ida in September 2006, and changed its name to AQIM in January 2007. 10 Despite its adoption of an international brand, the DOS assesses that AQIM is largely a regionally focused group with aspirations of creating an Islamic Caliphate in Algeria.
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At the root level, the GSPC (now AQIM) started in 1998 as an offshoot of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The GIA was one of the principal belligerents in the Algerian Civil war that began in December 1991. The conflict originated when the Islamic Salvation Front political party gained popularity amongst the Algerian electorate, and the ruling party --fearing an Islamic political takeover--cancelled elections after the first round. The GIA led the armed uprising that followed the cancellation of elections.
The GSPC originally broke with the GIA over the GIA's slaughter of civilians. 12 Following the ascension of Abdelazize Bouteflika to president of Algeria in 1999 and the granting of an amnesty to the GIA, GSPC membership fell to approximately 600.
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Confrontations with Algerian security services resulted in the arrest and killing of key leaders, which caused disarray in the group. 14 Algerian citizens lost tolerance for the GSPC's violent tactics, and the GSPC exhausted the goodwill of rural populations in
Algeria that served as their sanctuary. 15 Both to ensure their survival and revitalize their base, the GSPC shifted their ideology from domestic insurgency to global jihad and expanded their area of operations to the Sahel.
AQIM's headquarters, and center of gravity, remains in northeast Algeria, however, they maintain several operational units (called katibah in Arabic) in the Sahel. 16 Unable to organize operational cells in Tunisia, Libya and Morocco, AQIM successfully recruited small numbers of fighters from Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. 17 The group is significantly constrained by poor finances and a lack of broad general appeal to moderate Sufi Muslims in the region. 18 In Algeria, it has not been able to conduct spectacular attacks since it bombed the United Nations building and Algerian government buildings in 2007. 19 In Algeria, AQIM continues to conduct small-scale attacks and ambushes against security forces, and regularly uses improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 20 22 Evidence also suggests that AQIM funneled significant numbers of North African fighters to Iraq. 23 In terms of identifying the actors, the lines of authority and affiliation blur when attempting to determine whether actors are leftovers from the GIA in early the early 1990s -which numbered in the tens of thousands, former members of the GSPC -which numbered in the thousands, or AQIM -which numbers in mere hundreds. 24 A second narrative of AQIM accounts for this de-evolution from the Algerian Civil War of the 1990s to the present.
This more nuanced narrative discounts AQIM affiliations with al Qa-ida, believes the group is shifting towards more of a criminal organization that uses Islam in a superficial sense, and highlights Algerian geo-strategic interests. -They haven't done anything spectacular,‖ said Hugh Roberts, the former head of International Crisis
Group's North Africa Project. -They have not actually pulled off a spectacular attack in Europe in the eight years they've existed…(something) that you have to put in balance against European security services that say the group is a major threat.‖ 25 AQIM's allegiance to al Qa-ida is a formality of desperation born from the effectiveness of Algerian security services and without practical significance. According to this narrative, actions rather than words portray an organization that is most interested in kidnapping
Westerners for profit and trafficking in drugs and other contraband. In a version of a geo-strategic kabuki dance, Algeria is using its intimate knowledge of an organization it has followed for almost 20 years as it morphed from the GIA to the GSPC to AQIM to improve its regional status with Sahel states and to garner the interest (and treasure) of external actors such as the United States and the European Union. 26 In reality, the actual threat that AQIM poses probably lies somewhere between the two narratives. Lianne Kennedy-Boudani, currently at Rand and previously at the Africa's future is up to the Africans.‖ 45 Characterizing the relationship as a -strategic partnership,‖ four lines of effort were articulated: (1) support for strong and stable democratic governments, (2) support for development that provides opportunity for more people, (3) strengthening public health, and (4) support for strengthening security capacity. 46 A clear intent of the speech it that the four lines of effort would not be U.S. said the partnership has two primary purposes. First, the TSCTP will identify and mobilize resources throughout the interagency to support sustained efforts to address violent extremism in the region. To achieve long-term results, the emphasis will be placed upon key capacity deficits that can be addressed over a period of years through the resources and expertise of DOS, DoD, and USAID. 48 Because of differing threats, political environments, and resource needs, programs for engagement and assistance under TSCTP would be tailored to fit the priorities of the individual countries. 49 Second, Carson explained that the TSCTP was designed with the goal of coordinating or synchronizing the interagency effort at three levels. The first level of coordination takes place at the sub-deputy level in Washington. 50 The second level consists of representatives in Washington and USAFRICOM meeting regularly with embassies in the TSCTP countries. 51 The final level of coordination is at the embassy The strategy against AQIM shifted over time. As defined by the global war on terror, the solution started with a military emphasis. Initial efforts to align the strategy began in the region, led by USEUCOM (and later AFRICOM) and the embassies, not
Washington. This leads to a second conclusion that follows from TSCTP: In Irregular
Warfare, anticipate strategies evolving from the bottom up to accommodate a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to the threat. commonly staffed by junior officers, often on their first assignments. 69 Moreover, there were significant deficiencies in the ability, training, and experience of officers serving in -stretch‖ assignments. 70 Many junior officers stretched into more senior positions lacked managerial experience and the supervisory guidance to effectively do their jobs. 71 As a consequence, senior staff, including ambassadors, spent more time on operational matters and less time on policy planning and coordination. 72 person Marine Security Guard detachment was added shortly thereafter. 75 In 2006 a USAID coordinator was added to manage development programs, and there are plans to add a security assistance officer in 2011 to manage military-to-military cooperation programs. 76 The net effect of the lack of capacity is that the DOS-managed embassy platform was not staffed to match the pace of USEUCOM's (and later USAFRICOM's) staffing and coordination initiatives. This leads directly to a third conclusion that can be drawn from the TSCTP: Although an Irregular Warfare strategy may be implemented at the embassy level, overseas diplomatic missions are not always staffed to meet the requirements of a whole-of-government approach; they will grow to meet the need, but not overnight. Failure to understand the formal and informal aspects of embassy culture can produce friction in the interagency environment, particularly at a small embassy. A 2010 GAO report noted that -USAFRICOM staff have limited knowledge about working with U.S. embassies and about cultural issues in Africa, and the training or guidance available to augment personal experience in these areas is limited.‖ 78 While there have been efforts to increase GCC temporary staff expertise in these areas, the limited knowledge among some staff puts USAFRICOM at risk of being unable to fully leverage resources with diplomatic mission personnel, build relationships with African nations, and effectively carry out DoD activities. 79 In 2010, USAFRICOM established an interagency collaborative forum to assess, prioritize, and implement the recommendations from the GAO assessment. 80 It is popular to say culture eats strategy for lunch. 81 For the interagency culture of a small-or medium-sized embassy this is a truism. The key to negotiating the culture, which is ruled predominately by the U.S. Foreign Service, are interpersonal skills. This leads to a fourth conclusion that can be drawn from TSCTP: If Irregular Warfare is executed from the platform of an embassy, personal relations with individuals from other agencies are critical; spend as much time mastering the embassy interagency culture as that of the host country.
Interagency Cultural

Legal Authorities and Tradition: Chief of Mission and the Combatant
Commander. Although State, USAID, and the DoD jointly collaborated in implementing the TSCTP, the GAO found that disagreements about whether the ambassador should have authority over DoD personnel temporarily assigned to conduct TSCTP activities has hampered implementation. 82 As evidence of this the report, DoD officials complained in 2007 when the ambassador in Niger limited the number of DoD personnel in country because of concerns over the country's fragile political environment and the limited support capacity in the embassy. 83 In Chad, another ambassador called for a -strategic pause‖ to TSCTP activities to reassess the mission's ability to support activities. 84 The authorities of the GCC are derived from Title 10, USC Department's reply to the GAO, the friction is clearly articulated:
Most DoD personnel implementing TSCTP activities on a nonpermanent basis are under the command of the area military commander and thus, pursuant to the terms of the President's letter to COMs, do not directly fall under COM authority. In practice, however, these DoD personnel come under COM control at post: they seek clearance from the Ambassador to enter the country to conduct their activities, and while posted there they abide by COM rules and policies and are subject to the COM's supervision. DoD's common practice in TSCTP countries of deploying personnel for seriatim "enduring presence" extended tdy periods, however, creates positions considered "permanent" under Department policy. Like other permanent Mission positions, employees encumbering those positions should come under COM authority. To insure the full coordination of the U.S. effort, U.S. representatives at the country level shall constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador…. The Ambassador's responsibility for coordination, general direction, and leadership shall be given renewed emphasis, and all United States elements shall be re-indoctrinated with respect to the Ambassador's role as senior representative for the United States in the Country. 94 Although a construct and not codified in law, the country team is where unity of effort is achieved in each embassy. Washington makes policy and embassies implement through interagency country teams. A sub-committee of the country team, commonly referred to a -executive‖ or -core‖ group has access to various compartmented information sources. This group --usually numbering no more than four or five persons in even the largest of embassies --meet separately when required to discuss the most sensitive issues, e.g., classified threat information or Title 50 activities 95 that may impact a mission or host-nation relations. In an era of universal condemnation of the interagency process and calls for reform, the full-time country team is often pointed out as one of the few places it works:
When compared to Washington, the efficiency of interagency work at various field offices additionally reaps the advantage of operating on a significantly reduced scale. Each Mission has the opportunity to designate clearly its objectives and stipulate an interagency plan of action to achieve these aims. At most embassies, an economy of scale greatly enhances cross-disciplinary and interagency awareness and familiarity, allowing informal networks and personal relationships to strengthen cooperation and improve outcomes. 96 A limiting factor of the effectiveness, however, is that the functioning of the team is dependent upon the quality of leadership provided by the ambassador.  Anticipate strategies evolving -possibly from the bottom up --to accommodate a comprehensive whole-of-government approach to the threat.
 Overseas diplomatic missions are not always staffed to meet the requirements of a whole-of-government approach; they will grow to meet the need, but not overnight. has, the United States will counter transnational terrorism with the interagency processes and overseas missions we have, not the ones we wish for.
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